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CONTRADICTION AS A FORM OF CONTRACTUAL
INCOMPLETENESS*
Dana Heller and Ran Spiegler
A simple model is presented, in which contradictory instructions are viewed as a type of contract
incompleteness. The model provides a complexity-based rationale for contradictory instructions. If
there are complexity bounds on the contract, there may be an incentive to introduce contradictions,
leaving for another agent the task of interpreting them. The optimal amount of contradictions
depends on the complexity bound, the conﬂict of interests with the interpreter and the institutional
constraints on his interpretations. In particular, a higher complexity bound may result in a larger
amount of contradictions.
The contract-theoretic literature has identiﬁed two different notions of contract
incompleteness. First, a contract is incomplete if it is not as ﬁne as it should be, given
veriﬁability constraints. Second, a contract is incomplete if it has lacunae – i.e., it
ignores some states of the world. In this article we identify a third type of contract
incompleteness: contradictory instructions. To motivate this idea, consider a contract that
consists of two clauses:
(i) in case of an earthquake, take action a;
(ii) in case of a ﬁre, do not take action a.
This contract has a lacuna, as it fails to specify what happens when neither of the two
events (earthquake, ﬁre) takes place. However, the contract also contains a contra-
diction: if both events happen simultaneously, the contract speciﬁes mutually contra-
dictory actions.
The contradiction is due to the fact that the contract is a function that assigns actions
to events, rather than mutually exclusive states. Existing contract-theoretic literature
typically formalises a contract as a function from states to actions (a couple of excep-
tions are Battigalli and Maggi (2002) and Shavell (2006); see below). Such a formalism
can capture the familiar types of contract incompleteness but it cannot capture con-
tradictions. However, real-life contracts are written in natural language. A contingency
stated in natural language typically corresponds to an event, rather than to an indi-
vidual state. Therefore, it may be more ﬁtting to formalise a contract as a function from
events to actions. Such a formalism can accommodate contradictions.
In this short article we study a simple model that provides a rationale for this third
type of contract incompleteness, based on the notion of contracts as functions from
events to actions. The rationale is a variant on the writing-complexity argument for
contract incompleteness, due to Dye (1985), Anderlini and Felli (1994, 1999) and
Battigalli and Maggi (2002). In the model, one agent, referred to as the Writer, uni-
laterally writes down a list of instructions for another agent, referred to as the Interpreter,
to carry out. There is a conﬂict of interests between the Writer and the Interpreter. The
state space is [0, 1). An instruction consists of an event – i.e., a subset of [0, 1) – and an
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[ 875 ]action. Two instructions are contradictory if they specify intersecting events and dif-
ferent actions. A lacuna exists if there are states of the world which are not covered by
any instruction.
When a state of nature is covered by exactly one instruction, the Interpreter is
obliged to take the action that this instruction speciﬁes in this state. However, when the
state falls into a lacuna or a contradiction, the Interpreter exercises discretion. We
impose a single constraint on the Interpreter’s discretion: if two states belong to the
same set of events in the Writer’s instructions list, then the Interpreter must take the
same action in both states.
The following scenario illustrates the model. Suppose that the Writer is a set of
contracting parties or a legislature, whereas the Interpreter is a court of law. An
instructions list is a contract or a law. When a state is realised and gives rise to a lacuna
or a contradiction, the court steps in and provides an interpretation. The constraint we
impose on the court’s discretion reﬂects a precedent system. Even if the court can observe
the true state, a precedent system implies that the court must arrive at the same ruling
in two states which are equivalent in terms of the contract or law in question.
If there were no limitations on the Writer’s instructions list, he would want to write
down a complete contract and leave no discretion to the Interpreter, because of their
conﬂict of interests. However, we assume that there are two complexity bounds on the
Writer’s instructions list. First, there is an upper bound K on the number of
instructions on the list. Second, the family of events on which he can draw is
restricted. Speciﬁcally, an admissible event is a union of no more than r disjoint
intervals in [0, 1). Thus, r is a measure of the richness of the language in which events
are phrased.
Complexity measures are inevitably artiﬁcial, and the present case is no exception.
Nevertheless, we believe that it is reasonable to interpret K and r as measures of the
complexity of writing the instructions list. The larger the number of instructions, and
the larger the number of contingencies on which each instruction conditions, the more
costly it is to write the instructions list.
1 As Battigalli and Maggi (2002) state:
...we have in mind costs that are, broadly speaking, proportional to the
amount of detail in the contract, such as the cost of ﬁguring out the
relevant contingencies and obligations, the cost of thinking how to describe
them, the cost of time needed to write the contract, and the cost of lawyers.
(p. 798)
Thus, a key feature of our model is that the Writer’s decision how much interpre-
tational freedom to assign the court is strategic, and takes writing costs into account.
We believe that this is a realistic feature of the contracting or legislative process. To
quote Shavell (2006):
We also observe that the courts actively engage in the interpretation of con-
tracts. The courts ﬁll gaps in contracts, resolve conﬂicts and ambiguities of
language, and sometimes replace the parties express terms with the courts
1 Note that we capture writing complexity by placing the upper bounds K and r, rather than by specifying a
cost function which is increasing in K and r. This is done to facilitate exposition, and does not affect the
qualitative results.
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inﬂuence how parties write contracts: the more closely the courts interpreted
contracts resemble the parties true wishes, the more willing the parties are to
leave gaps and to write fairly general terms, whereas parties are more willing to
take extra pains to write more detailed contracts when courts refrain from
interpreting terms or interpret terms in ways that run counter to their true
desires. (p. 290)
The model studied by Shavell (2006) shares our model’s general structure, the
crucial difference being that it rules out contradictions. Nevertheless, as the above
quote attests, Shavell acknowledges the relevance of contradictions for the act of
interpretation. Indeed, according to Farnsworth (1999), a substantial proportion of
contract trial cases in the American judicial system are concerned with interpretation,
which usually involves overriding terms, ambiguities of language and internal con-
tradictions in terms.
Given the complexity constraints, the Writer has an incentive to create contradictions
because they reﬁne the effective partition that is induced by the instructions list. Recall
the earthquake–ﬁre example. There are four states of the world: nothing happens, only
an earthquake occurs, only a ﬁre occurs, both an earthquake and a ﬁre occur. A
complete contract specifying different actions for different states would require at least
four instructions. However, if there is no conﬂict of interests between the two agents,
the two-clause contract achieves the same outcome. By allowing the Interpreter to
interpret contradictions and lacunae, we effectively reﬁne the instructions list. How-
ever, when there is a conﬂict of interests between the two agents, the Writer has to trade
off this consideration with his desire not to give the Interpreter too much discretion.
Using a standard Crawford-Sobel model of the conﬂict of interests between the
Writer and the Interpreter, we show that the equilibrium degree of vagueness – i.e., the
measure of states that fall into contradictory instructions or lacunae in subgame perfect
equilibrium – is increasing with r. Such a clear-cut relation does not exist with respect to
K. When r ¼ 1, the equilibrium degree of vagueness decreases with K. In contrast,
when r is very large, an increase in K may result in a greater degree of vagueness.
Nevertheless, if K is sufﬁciently large, there no lacunae or contradictions in equilib-
rium.
These results may be surprising at ﬁrst glance: one would expect a priori that a Writer
with more linguistic resources would leave less for the Interpreter to interpret, due to
their conﬂict of interests. The intuition for our results is that with larger linguistic
resources it is possible to generate a lot more contradictions, thus enabling the
Interpreter to reﬁne his strategy. Because the Writer is risk-averse, this strengthens his
incentive to introduce contradictions.
The characterisation of the equilibrium instructions list is of particular interest in the
case of r ¼ 1 – i.e., when the events on which instructions condition are intervals. The K
events on the list constitute a pseudo-interval partition with fuzzy borders. This
structure has a natural interpretation: the Writer invokes categories such as very low,
moderately low, moderately high, etc. but the exact demarcation of these categories
is fuzzy.
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interpret contradictions. We demonstrate this point by examining two alternative
methods of interpretation:
(i) when a state is covered by several contradictory instructions, the Interpreter is
bound to select one of the actions speciﬁed in these instructions;
(ii) there are no constraints at all on the Interpreter’s discretion in case of lacunae
or contradictions.
In both cases, the rationale for contradictions disappears. These observations dem-
onstrate the importance that norms of contract interpretation have for contractual
incompleteness, and consequently the need for continued exploration of the ways in
which courts interpret incomplete contracts.
1. Related Literature
Dye (1985) is the ﬁrst paper to model the writing costs of contracts explicitly. His
measure of a contract’s complexity is the number of contingencies on which the
contract conditions (this is analogous to K in the present article). However, he assumes
that the contract speciﬁes a partition of the state space, thereby ruling out both lacunae
and contradictions.
Battigalli and Maggi (2002) propose to model contracts as functions of events. They
analyse a propositional model of contracts, in which events are deﬁned by disjunctions
and conjunctions of elementary propositions and their negations. However, they
exclude contradictions, by focusing on what they call feasible contracts.
2 Our article
can be viewed as a modest contribution to their line of thought.
Shavell (2006) is the closest work to the present article. Shavell models a contract as a
function of events, yet like Battigalli and Maggi (2002), he rules out contradiction by
assuming that these events are mutually exclusive. Shavell assumes that contracts are
interpreted by the court, and studies the contracting parties optimal choice of con-
tracts, given the court’s method of interpretation. Thus, our article may be viewed as an
extension of Shavell’s model in the direction of incorporating contradictions into
contracts.
Posner (2005) provides a reduced-form, cost-beneﬁt analysis of contract interpreta-
tion, weighing the negotiation and interpretation costs associated with a contract.
Anderlini et al. (2001, 2003) are the only other papers that we are aware of, in which
the court plays an active part in a contract-theoretic model. In their model, the court
can void the contract in case of lacunae (which arise from unforeseen contingencies).
When a court voids the contract, the contracting parties can renegotiate. The model
does not accommodate contradictions. These papers study the effects of the court’s
policy on the contracting parties incentives.
As Lipman (2003) points out, there is a close link between the study of contradictions
in contracts and the study of vagueness in natural language. Hopefully, further
exploration of the former might also shed light on the latter.
2 Battigalli and Maggi acknowledge the possibility of contradictions (see footnote 11 in their paper) and
the court’s need to intervene in such cases but they do not develop this idea.
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Two agents, a Writer and an Interpreter, play a sequential-move game. Their underlying
conﬂict of interests is modelled as in the well-known example due to Crawford and
Sobel (1982). Let X ¼ [0, 1) be a set of states of nature. A subset of X is called an event.
The state is drawn from the uniform probability measure l over [0, 1). The set of actions
which are available to the Interpreter is the set of real numbers R. Player js vNM utility
function is given by uj(x,a) ¼  (x   mjþa)
2, where mj 2 R is his ideal point. Without
loss of generality, let mwriter ¼ 0 and denote minterpreter ¼ m. Assume that m 6¼ 0.
The order of moves is as follows. The Writer moves ﬁrst. He chooses an instructions
list, which is a sequence c ¼ð ec
k;ac
kÞk¼1;...;K, where ec
k is an event and ac
k is an action. For
simplicity (and without loss of generality), we require all the actions speciﬁed by the
instructions list to be distinct – i.e., for every distinct k,l 2f 1, ..., Kg, ac
k 6¼ ac
l .W e
refer to ck ¼ð ec
k;ac




c need not be a partition of X. We assume that for every k, ec
k 2E , where E is a family of
admissible events.
We introduce E in order to capture bounds on the complexity, or richness, of the
language for describing events. Therefore, we impose some structure on E. Given that
the state space is [0, 1), a natural primitive event is an interval. Thus, we assume that
every element in E is a union of no more than r   1 disjoint intervals in [0, 1). The
larger r, the richer the language in which events are phrased.
3
Before we describe the Interpreter’s move, let us introduce some notation. For every
J  f 1,..,Kg, deﬁne
pc
J ¼f x 2½ 0;1Þs.t. x 2 ec
k 8 k 2 J and x j 2ec
k 8 k j 2Jg:
The set pc
J consists of all states which are covered by the subset of instructions J in the
instructions list c. Note that the collection fpc
JgJ f1;::;Kg is a partition of X: two states
belong to the same pc
J if and only if they are covered by exactly the same subset J of
instructions. We refer to the collection of non-empty sets in fpc
JgJ f1;::;Kg as the effective
partition induced by E
c, and denote it by P
c. For every x 2 [0, 1), let J
c(x) denote the
subset of instructions that cover x. Formally, J
c(x) ¼f k 2f 1,...,Kg s.t. x 2 ec
kg.
Whenever jJ
c(x)j¼1, x is covered by exactly one instruction – hence, there is no
vagueness regarding the action that the Interpreter needs to take in state x. When
jJ
c(x)j¼0, x falls into a lacuna, because it is not covered by any instruction. When
jJ
c(x)j > 1, x is covered by multiple instructions. Since we assume that the actions
speciﬁed by these instructions are different, the instructions are mutually contradic-
tory. Given an instructions list c, let d(c)b et h eamount of vagueness that characterises it.
Formally, d(c) is the l-measure of states x for which jJ
c(x)j 6¼ 1.
The Interpreter moves after the Writer has made his choice. Given ðec
k;ac
kÞk¼1;...;K, the
Interpreter chooses a function I:P
c!R. That is, the Interpreter’s strategy is measurable
with respect to the effective partition induced by E
c. We impose a single condition on I :
3 The intervals may be open or closed. This distinction is immaterial because of the non-atomicity of l. For
notational consistency, we assume that the intervals are half-open of the form [xl,xh).
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c(x) 6¼ / and ac




In particular, if J is a singleton fkg, then Iðpc
JÞ¼ac
k. That is, the Interpreter’s strategy
must coincide with the Writer’s strategy when pc
J does not represent a lacuna or a
contradiction. In other words, the Interpreter is allowed to exercise discretion only in
case of a lacuna or a contradiction.
The model captures situations in which one agent writes down a set of instructions to
be carried out by another agent. The ﬁrst agent can build contradictions or lacunae
into his instructions. On one hand, the contradictions and lacunae give the second
agent discretion, which runs against the ﬁrst agent’s interests. On the other hand, they
help the second agent reﬁne his strategy, which is favourable to the ﬁrst agent because
it reduces decision errors.
We may interpret an instructions list as a law, so that the Writer represents a legis-
lature and the Interpreter is a court of law. The court is asked to interpret laws when
those contain contradictions and lacunae. Under this interpretation, the assumption
that I is measurable with respect to P
c reﬂects a precedent system. Even if the court
knows the state of nature, the precedent system forces the court to make the same
decision in two states which are indistinguishable in the eyes of the law. Of course, for
this interpretation to make sense, we need to assume that following the enactment of
the law, the court handles a large number of cases, each corresponding to an inde-
pendent realisation of x. Thus, a strategy for the Interpreter is a long-run, systematic
policy for ruling cases. Note that the assumption that the Writer and the Interpreter
have conﬂicting interests is natural in the context of this interpretation, as legislatures
and courts often have divergent political biases (e.g., the supreme court may have a
liberal bent while the legislature is dominated by conservatives and vice versa).
The parameters K and r are indicators of the amount of detail in the law: K is the
number of contingencies on which actions are conditioned, and r measures the com-
plexity of each contingency. Economists are sometimes suspicious of the notion of
writing costs, as if it involved the mere cost of ink. However, contracts and laws that
contain a greater number of complex contingencies are more costly to prepare,
because the act of putting the instructions into words is difﬁcult and time consuming.
We conclude this Section with a number of comments regarding the interpretation
of the model.
Lacunae versus contradictions. The distinction between lacunae and contradictions in
our model is quite artiﬁcial. A lacuna is simply identiﬁed as a particular cell pc
/ in the
effective partition and treated just like any other cell pc
J for which jJj > 1. We could
modify our model by allowing the Writer to add a basket clause to the instructions list,
which assigns a particular action to any x which belongs to none of the events in the list.
The motivation for such a modiﬁcation is that the writing costs associated with a basket
clause are negligible, compared to the costs associated with the other instructions in
the list. However, this modiﬁed model would be more cumbersome to analyse than
ours, while the qualitative results would be the same.
Alternative complexity measures. The basic building blocks in the description of events
are intervals. Alternatively, we could assume that a primitive event is an inequality
(x > x0 or x < x0), so that an event in E would be a combination of unions or
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inequalities (except for intervals of the form (0,x0)o r( x0,1), which can be described as
a single inequality), our analysis would be qualitatively the same. Another notion of
complexity, employed by Anderlini and Felli (1994) is based on the concept of com-
putable functions. The distinction between computable and incomputable contracts is
irrelevant in the present context. As we shall see below, when K is sufﬁciently large, the
Writer’s incentive to create lacunae and contradictions disappears. Thus, contract
incompleteness in the sense we focus on does not rely on this distinction but on the
simpler question of the contract’s length.
Further constraints on interpretation. We place no restriction on the Interpreter’s dis-
cretion in case of lacunae or contradictions, apart from the measurability condition
which captures a precedent system. One could imagine additional constraints. For
instance, suppose that when two instructions k and j specify contradictory actions, ac
k
and ac
j , for a certain state, the Interpreter’s choice of action must reﬂect some aver-
aging of the two actions. That is, the Interpreter cannot totally disregard the actions
speciﬁed by the conﬂicting instructions. Such additional constraints on the Inter-
preter’s strategy are assumed away, for the sake of expositional simplicity. In Section 4,
we discuss alternative methods of interpretation.
Costs of interpretation. One could argue that while focusing on writing costs, we
completely ignore the cost of interpreting contradictions and lacunae; see Posner
(2005) for a discussion of such costs. If the Writer does not bear the interpretation
costs, including them will not affect our analysis. Of course, if the Writer does take into
account the costs of interpretation, we need a more elaborate model to analyse the
trade-off between writing costs and interpretation costs.
3. Analysis
In this Section we analyse the subgame perfect equilibrium in the game. In particular,
we are interested in the equilibrium degree of vagueness d(c ) – i.e., the measure of states
that fall into lacunae and contradictions – which is induced by the equilibrium
instructions list c  ¼ð e 
k;a 
kÞk¼1;...;K. Denote E  ¼f e 
1;;;:;e 
Kg, and let P  ¼f p 
J gJ f1;...;Kg
be the induced effective partition.
The players quadratic utility function has an immediate implication, which is well
known and therefore not proved here.
Proposition 1 For any set B   [0, 1), let aj(B)   arg max aEBuj(x,a). Then,
EB[x þ aj(B)] ¼ mj.
That is, if the Interpreter has discretion over some event B, he will choose the action
that adjusts the expected value of x þ a to be m. If the Interpreter lacks discretion over
B, the Writer will choose the action that adjusts the expected value of x þ a to be 0.
This observation greatly facilitates our analysis. In the effective partition P  , every set
p 
J for which jJj 6¼ 1 is associated with a probability distribution over x þa, whose mean
is m. Similarly, every set p 
J for which jJj¼1 is associated with a probability distribution
over x þ a, whose mean is 0. The Writer faces the following trade-off. If he creates
contradictions, he reﬁnes the effective partition. On one hand, the reﬁnement reduces
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reﬁnement delegates more events to the Interpreter, thereby moving the expected
value of x þ a away from the Writer’s ideal point.
Let us turn to the structure of contradictions and lacunae. The number of contra-
dictions induced by the equilibrium instructions list is the number of sets p 
J in P   for
which jJj>1. We will say that E   contains a lacuna if p 
/ is non-empty.
Proposition 2 Suppose that d(c  ) > 0. Then:
(i) P   is an intervals partition.
(ii) The number of contradictions induced by c   is the maximal possible, given K and r.
(iii) E   contains a lacuna.
(iv) All cells p 
J with jJj¼1 have the same measure, and all cells p 
J with jJj 6¼ 1 have the
same measure.
Proof. Let us prove part (i) ﬁrst. Let c be an instructions list whose induced effective
partition P
c is not an intervals partition. Our ﬁrst step is to show that c can be trans-
formed into another instructions list, whose induced effective partition constitutes an
intervals partition and contains as many cells as P
c. By assumption, one of the elements
pc
J in E
c is a union of n > 1 disjoint intervals. Let us try to transform c so that one of
these intervals [x1,x2) is subtracted from pc
J. In order to do so, we need to select some
instruction k 2 J and subtract [x1,x2) from ec
k. Since n>1, the modiﬁed pc
J remains
non-empty.
This modiﬁcation is infeasible only if it turns ec
k into a union of more than r
disjoint intervals. But this can occur only if an adjacent interval (say, [x2,x3), w.l.o.g)
belongs to pc
L for some L   J. In this case, for every l 2 LnJ, we can modify ec
l by
lengthening one of its intervals so that it contains [x1,x2). Note that this additional
modiﬁcation merely expands one of the intervals of pc
L, without changing the
number of disjoint intervals of which it consists. In this fashion we manage to
induce an effective partition which differs from P
c in that the interval [x1,x2)i s
subtracted from pc
J, without reducing the number of cells in the effective partition.
We can then reiterate this type of modiﬁcation, until we get an effective partition
which is an intervals partition and contains as many cells as P
c.
To complete the proof of part (i), we need to show that it is optimal for the
Writer to construct an instructions list which induces an effective partition satisfying
two properties: ﬁrst, it is an intervals partition; and second, it contains the largest
number of cells that is feasible under (K,r). By Proposition 1, each of the K cells p 
J
in P   with jJj¼1 induces a probability distribution over x þ a, whose mean is 0.
Similarly, each cell p 
J in P   with jJj 6¼ 1 induces a probability distribution over
x þ a, whose mean is m. The Writer’s vNM utility function is quadratic. Therefore,
conditional on a delegated event B, and given l(B), the Writer’s expected utility is
higher if B is an interval. Similarly, given that B is an interval, the Writer’s expected
utility conditional on B is higher if l(B) is lower. Therefore, if the largest effective
partition given (K,r) is implementable as an intervals partition, the Writer will ﬁnd it
optimal. Moreover, because the Writer is risk-averse, it is optimal for him that all
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J with jJj¼1 have the same measure and all intervals p 
J with jJj 6¼ 1 have
the same measure. Obviously, the largest possible effective partition contains the
largest possible number of contradictions and a lacuna. This also proves parts (ii)–
(iv). n
The intuition for this result is simple. Suppose that E
 
is not a partition – i.e., it
delegates a non-empty set of states B to the Interpreter. By Proposition 1, every event
that is delegated to the Interpreter induces a probability distribution over x þ a with
expected value m. Because the Writer is risk-averse, it is optimal for him to split B into as
many intervals as possible, thereby reducing the variance of this distribution. This is
attained by creating a lacuna and as many contradictions as possible. The less trivial
part of the proof is to show that it is in fact possible to induce an effective partition
which both contains the largest number of cells that is feasible given (K,r), and con-
stitutes an intervals partition.
In the remainder of this Section, we analyse the cases of r ¼ 1 and r > 1 separately.
3.1. The Case of r ¼ 1
This special case is of particular interest, for two reasons. First, the family of admissible
events is intuitively the simplest possible, given the state space. Second, the equilibrium
instructions list turns out to have an interesting structure. We will say that c induces a
fuzzy partition if there exists a numbering of the elements in E, such that:
(i) the only allowed intersections between ec
k and ec
j are as follows: k and j must be
consecutive, and neither interval contains the other;
(ii) the lacuna is either [0,x  )o r[ x  ,1).
In a fuzzy partition, adjacent events are almost disjoint, except that the border
between them is blurred. Thus, the effective partition consists of 2K intervals, of which
K intervals are delegated to the Interpreter.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium instructions list c   induces a fuzzy partition. All undele-
gated intervals in P   are of equal measure [1   d(c  )]/K and all delegated intervals in P   are of
equal measure d(c  )/K.
Proof. By Proposition 2, the effective partition induced by c   is an intervals partition.
No effective partition can contain more than K undelegated intervals. A fuzzy partition
contains exactly K undelegated intervals, as well as K delegated intervals. Therefore, all
we need to show is that no effective partition can contain more than 2K intervals. To




all k ¼ 1, ..., K. Therefore, the effective partition is an intervals partition, in which two
adjacent intervals are demarcated by some xl
k or xh
k. Therefore, the effective partition
cannot contain more than 2K intervals. It follows that a fuzzy partition is optimal for the
Writer. The measure of each delegated and undelegated cell in the fuzzy partition
follows directly from part (iv) of Proposition 2. n
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2), and his expected utility conditional on an undelegated interval is
 (1 d)
2/12K








þð 1   dÞ
ð1   dÞ
2
12k2
which yields the desired solution. n
The interpretation of this pair of results is attractive, in the sense that it is suggestive
of features discernible in real-life laws and contracts. The Writer chooses the events in
the instructions list so that they constitute a pseudo-partition with fuzzy borders. It is as
if the language that the Writer employs has a more-or-less clear notion of the meaning
of the words very bad, bad, moderately good, etc. but their demarcation is fuzzy. For
any instruction ðe 
k;a 
kÞ in the optimal list, the action a 
k is targeted at the set of clear-
cut cases, in which the realised state is unquestionably covered by instruction k only.
The ambiguous borderline cases are left for the Interpreter to decide.
The comparative statics are also intuitive. As K decreases (capturing a situation with
high writing costs) and as the conﬂict of interests between the two parties diminishes,
the ambiguous borderline cases become more prevalent. If Km > 1=2, there is no
delegation at all in equilibrium.
3.2. The Case of r > 1
What happens to the equilibrium degree of vagueness when we raise r, thus enriching
the Writer’s language?
Proposition 5 d(c  ) weakly increases with r.
Proof. By Proposition 2, P   is an intervals partition. Moreover, the number of undele-
gated intervals in P   is K. Therefore, when we raise r, we enable a larger number of
delegated intervals without reducing the feasible number of undelegated intervals. This
means that conditional on delegation, the Writer’s expected utility increases, because
each delegated interval becomes narrower. But this means that d(c  ) cannot decrease
with r. n
Thus, as the Writer’s language becomes richer, he chooses to increase the degree of
vagueness. A priori, one could expect that having richer linguistic resources should
lead the Writer to delegate less to the Interpreter. However, a richer language implies
that the Writer can create a larger number of contradictions. More contradictions
imply a ﬁner effective partition, hence a smaller loss from delegating events to the
Interpreter. Note that as long as d(c  ) > 0, the number of contradictions remains the
same, in accordance with Proposition 2.
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saw that when r ¼ 1, d(c  ) decreases with K – i.e., that a longer instructions list implies
a lower equilibrium degree of vagueness. It turns out that this is not a general result.
Note that if r is very large, it is possible to construct an instructions list that induces an
effective partition with 2
K cells, such that every cell in the partition corresponds to a
different element in the power set of K.
Using the same kind of reasoning as in Proposition 3, it can be shown that P  
contains K undelegated intervals of measure [1   d(c  )]/K each, as well as 2
K   K
delegated intervals of measure d(c  )/(2
K K) each. The implication of this feature of
P   is that the number of delegated intervals increases almost exponentially with the
length of the instructions list (as long as r is sufﬁciently large). Thus, an increase in K
allows a huge reﬁnement of the Interpreter’s strategy and therefore may raise the
Writer’s incentive to delegate.
The following example illustrates how an increase in K can result in an increase in
the equilibrium degree of vagueness. Let m ¼ 1=15 and r ¼ 3, and compare the cases
of K ¼ 2 and K ¼ 3. In both cases, r is sufﬁciently large so that P   consists of 2
K
intervals. When K ¼ 2, d(c  ) ¼ 0.4644, by Proposition 2. When K ¼ 3, given a degree
of vagueness d, the Writer’s expected utility conditional on a delegated interval is
 1=225   1=300d
2 and his expected utility conditional on an undelegated interval is
 1=108ð1   dÞ
2. It follows that d(c  ) ¼ 0.5.
Although we cannot produce a closed solution for d(c  ), we are able to provide an
upper bound. Note that for any (K,r) and any instructions list c, the Writer’s expected
utility conditional on a delegated interval is bounded from above by  m
2. This is a
consequence of Proposition 1. The degree of vagueness that the Writer would choose if
this bound could be attained cannot be lower than the equilibrium degree of vague-
ness. The Writer’s expected utility, given d and conditional on an undelegated interval,
is  (1   d)
2/12K




dð m2Þþð 1   dÞ





  ¼ maxð1   2Km;0Þ: ð1Þ
It follows that max(1   2 Km, 0) is an upper bound on d(c  ) for any (K,r). This
observation has the following implication.
Proposition 6 For any r, d(c  ) ¼ 0 if Km > 1
2.
Thus, if K is sufﬁciently large relative to the conﬂict of interests, the Writer will not
delegate anything to the Interpreter, regardless of r.
3.3. Which Type of Complexity is More Valuable?
Our model relies on two notions of complexity: the number of instructions K and the
maximal number r of elementary events on which every instruction can condition. If
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contains) as an indicator of its writing complexity, then Kr would be a reasonable
measure. The question naturally arises, suppose that the Writer were able to manip-
ulate K and r while keeping Kr ﬁxed, what would he choose to do? Would he prefer
a long list of simple instructions, or a short list of complex instructions? The following
result provides an answer.
Proposition 7 For a ﬁxed Kr, the Writer’s subgame perfect equilibrium payoff attains a
maximum when r ¼ 1.
Proof. FixKandr,andconsideranoptimalinstructionslistc  .Foreveryk ¼ 1, ..., K,e 
k
is a union of r disjoint intervals, denoted i 
k;1; ...; i 




¼ 1 and con-
struct the following instructions list c. For every k ¼ 1,...,K and every l ¼ 1, ..., r, let
ec
kl ¼ i 




) is the same as the
effective partition induced by c   under (K,r). In particular, for every state x, jJ  (x)j¼1
under (K,r) if and only if jJ
c(x)j¼1 under (K,r
0
). Moreover, whereas c   is forced by
deﬁnition to assign the same action to all intervals i 
k;1;...;i 
k;r, c assigns different
actions to different events ec
kl.
4 Therefore, the Writer’s equilibrium payoff under (K 0,r 0)
cannot be lower than his equilibrium payoff under (K,r). n
Thus, although both types of complexity are valuable to the Writer, the number of
instructions K is more valuable than the complexity r of every individual instruction.
4. Alternative Constraints on Interpretations
The rationale for contradictory instructions in this model is that another agent will
interpret them. Contradictions have an informational content that enables the two
agents to transgress the limits on the instructions list’s complexity. In this Section we
explore alternative constraints on the way the Interpreter interprets contradictions,
which capture alternative methods of interpretation. We shall see that the rationale
for contradictions disappears under these alternative constraints.
We emphasise that our focus in this article on a method of interpretation which is
bound by a precedent system (as well as to the written law or contract, in case there are
no contradictions or lacunae) is not because we believe that it is more realistic or
important than other methods, but because unlike the others we have examined, it
generates contradictions in equilibrium. See Shavell (2006) and Posner (2005) for
further discussion of various constraints on the interpretation of contracts.
4.1. Maximal Discretion
Let us relax the constraint that I is a measurable function of P
c. Instead, suppose that
the Interpreter’s strategy is a function I:[0, 1) ! R that assigns actions to states.W e
impose one constraint on this function: if ac
k ¼ a for every ec
k 2 Ec for which x 2 ec
k,
4 Although we forced c to assign different actions to different events, it can be veriﬁed that this is always
strictly optimal.
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he has total freedom in any other case. This variant of the model ﬁts situations in which
courts are not bound by precedents.
The rationale for contradictions disappears in this case. All that the Writer needs to
decide upon is the degree of vagueness d(c). Given the lack of any constraint on the
Interpreter’s discretion in case of vague instructions, there is no need to distinguish
between lacunae and contradictions: any state over which the Interpreter has discretion
will induce the outcome x þ a ¼ m with probability one. The Writer can attain the
optimal degree of vagueness with a lacuna and without introducing any contradiction.
Although the equilibrium list can contain contradictions, there is no special reason for
them and the list may contain only a lacuna.
The optimal degree of vagueness in this case is given by (1). When the Interpreter
has unlimited discretion in case of a lacuna, the Writer’s expected utility conditional on
delegation is precisely  m
2. The reason is that delegating an event to the Interpreter
completely eliminates the variance of x þ a (conditional on this event). As we saw in
Section 3.2, this leads to (1), which is larger than the equilibrium degree of vagueness
in our original model.
Note that the outcome of this alternative model Pareto-dominates the outcome given
by the original model. This exposes a weakness of the legislature-court interpretation.
Recall that we interpret the assumption that I is measurable with respect to P
c as
reﬂecting a precedent system. But our analysis in this sub-section reveals that such a
system is Pareto-inferior to a system without precedents. The question arises, what is the
rationale for the precedent system in the ﬁrst place? In order to address this question,
one would have to enlarge the scope of the model and incorporate the costs of
interpreting contradictions and lacunae.
4.2. Minimal Discretion
An alternative assumption, at the other extreme, is that when the Interpreter faces con-
tradictory instructions, he can only pick one of the actions speciﬁed by the instructions.
Formally, suppose that I:[0, 1) ! R is a function from states to actions but assume that
whenever J
c(x) 6¼ /, IðxÞ2f a 2 Rja ¼ ac
k and x 2 ec
k for some kg.
In this case, it is straightforward to see that there is no rationale for contradictions.
Suppose that x 2 ec
k;ec
j . The Interpreter is forced to choose between ac
k and ac
j . Clearly,
he will choose the action that is more favourable to him, which may be less favourable
for the Writer. Therefore, the instructions list induces an effective partition which
prescribes no more than K different actions (excluding the actions induced by a
lacuna). If the Writer avoided contradictions, he would be able to induce an effective
partition which prescribes K different actions (excluding the actions induced by a
lacuna) but these actions are better for him than the ones chosen by the Interpreter.
5. Conclusion
Our objective in this article is modest: to construct the simplest possible model that is
capable of accommodating contradictions in contracts and to provide a complexity-
based rationale for contradictions. The basic idea is that when writing complex
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another agent the task of interpreting them. The effect of complexity on the measure
of delegated states is sensitive to the complexity notion, as well as to the norms that
constrain the interpretation of contradictions. Hopefully, these ideas may inspire
further research on contract-theoretic models, in which the court actively interprets
laws and contracts.
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